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Abstract: 
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spread. Thus, contrary to predictions in the literature, multiple lending does not insure the 
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The beneﬁts of relationship lending under asymmetric information have been studied
widely, both theoretically and empirically (see Freixas (2005) and Boot (2000) for a
survey). A growing body of literature has demonstrated that close and enduring rela-
tionships between a ﬁrm and its banker can at least partially bridge the informational
asymmetry between the two parties. Such relationships can create value in several
ways. First, established relationships may improve credit availability, particularly in
diﬃcult times. Second, it will increase the lender’s willingness to renegotiate its loan
terms and to support borrower workout. Third, relationships reduce the likelihood
of ineﬃcient liquidations of ﬁrms. These value enhancing features have been shown
to survive even under the pressure of a systemic ﬁnancial crisis (Puri, Rocholl and
Steﬀen (2009)).
Much less attention, however, has been devoted to the potentially darker side
of relationship lending, its role in limiting competition, barring market entry, and
holding-up the borrower (Boot and Thakor (2000)). Of course, a prerequisite for a
hold-up of a borrower by its lender is the elimination of actual or potential outside
c o m p e t i t i o n .S i n c ei ti sd i ﬃcult to observe outside competition at the level of individ-
ual ﬁrm ﬁnancing, direct evidence on hold-up premiums in credit spreads is diﬃcult
to estimate, and we are not aware of any such attempt in the literature.
The key idea of this paper is to focus attention on the coordination between mul-
3tiple lenders vis-à-vis a common borrower. In order to capture coordination among
lenders, we use data from the German SME market where binding contractual pool
agreements between lenders are observed, notably if borrowers are in distress. Brun-
ner and Krahnen (2008) describe the institutional details of commonly used pool
arrangements. Based on the existence of such pool contracts, we can instrument for
the coordination among multiple lenders, and thus trace the eﬀect of limiting lender
competition on the observed loan spread.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, for single bank relation-
ships we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant spread premium which is higher for well collateralized single
banks compared to less collateralized ones. For relationship lenders (housebanks) we
cannot observe such a premium, be it in or out of distress. Second, if multiple bank
lenders successfully coordinate their positions using a pool arrangement, there is a
signiﬁcant increase in credit spreads relative to uncoordinated multiple banking. The
spread premiums for coordinated lenders rise with the number of lenders and in dis-
tress. Alongside, a signiﬁcantly positive dependency of the spread on borrower risk
as well as loan rate smoothing with respect to interest rate shocks can be conﬁrmed.
T h em a i nc o n c l u s i o nw ed r a wf r o mo u rﬁndings is that contrary to the predictions
in parts of the theoretical literature on ﬁnancial intermediation, multiple lending is
not necessarily a strong impediment against a hold-up by the lender. All it needs is a
legal environment that exempts a binding agreement between lenders from anti-trust
4legislation as long as it relates to a common borrower in distress. Our results suggest
that even if the number of lenders is large, contract renegotiation and opportunism
play an important role in lending relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature. Based on this, Section 3 derives the hypotheses
to be tested in this study. The data set and its descriptive statistics are described
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the estimation methodology and estimation results.
All results and their relevance for current research and policy are subsumed in the
concluding section 6.
2L i t e r a t u r e
2.1 Theoretical background
There is an extensive body of literature on interest rate setting in loan markets. In a
principal-agent framework it is assumed that the agent’s or loan applicant’s quality
or ability to repay a loan is private information and cannot be credibly communicated
to the principal, i.e. the bank. The bank only observes the average quality of loan
applicants. There are several reasons why the interest rate does not simply reﬂect
the average default risk of loan applicants and why not every applicant is granted a
loan.
First, Fried and Howitt (1980) ﬁnd interest rate smoothing within optimal con-
5tracting between a lender and a risk-averse borrower in fear of interest rate shocks. In
their risk-neutral model Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) ﬁn dt h e r ew i l lb ec r e d i tr a t i o n i n gi n
loan market equilibrium because the interest rate itself aﬀects the riskiness of the pool
of loans in two ways, i.e. the ex ante or adverse selection eﬀect where high interest
attracts high risk borrowers, and the ex post incentive or moral hazard eﬀect where
high interest encourages the borrower to switch to riskier projects once the contract
has been signed. Extending this line of thought, Bester (1985) suggests a menu of
loans contracts combining interest rate and collateral as a self selection device where
low-risk borrowers choose low interest and high collateral and high risk borrowers
select the opposite, high interest and low collateral.
Diamond (1984) develops a model of ﬁnancial intermediation, where monitoring
is delegated to a ﬁnancial intermediary avoiding either duplicated monitoring or no
monitoring as a consequence of free-riding. In Diamond (1989) a non-defaulting
borrower then creates reputation over the course of the lending relationship resulting
in decreasing interest rates. Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia (1989) predict that
incumbent banks charge loan rates that are higher than their cost of funds and higher
than the loan rates oﬀered by competing outside banks, i.e. outsiders incur initial
losses in order to attract customers which have to be oﬀset by positive rents in later
periods. Therefore, the longer a relationship lasts the more likely is the borrowing
ﬁrm to leave.
6Although relationship building reduces the moral hazard problem on the borrower
side, the relationship itself may create moral hazard on the part of the lender called
hold-up as discussed in Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989), Sharpe (1990) and
Rajan (1992). Hold-up evolves according to Rajan (1992) when the reputation the
borrower creates in a bank-borrower relationship regarding one’s loan repayment is
non-veriﬁable to outsiders. Thus, when borrowing from a single lender, this lender is
given an informational advantage over potential competitors, and he is able to realize
ar e n ta tt h er e ﬁnancing stage. Given a competitive environment, banks will oﬀer
potential borrowers lower interest rates in the ﬁrst period that are exceeded by their
cost of funds, and recoup thereafter when having created an informational advantage
vis-à-vis outside lenders. Gorton and Kahn (2000) present a model in which bank
loans are always renegotiated in contrast with bonds, and initial loan pricing does not
reﬂe c tbo r r o w e rq u a l i t y .I tr a t h e ri su t i l i z e dt oo p t i m i z et h eb a n k ’ sb a r g a i n i n gpo s i t i o n
in later renegotiation by minimizing moral hazard, namely asset substitution. Thus
loan pricing may be non-linear in borrower risk including initial transfers to either
side of the contract. Rajan (1992) as well as Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and
Berglof et al. (2000) conclude that multiple lending, i.e. borrowing from more than
one lender helps mitigating the lender’s moral hazard and deter the borrower from
strategic default. However, it does not come without cost. Multiple debt is harder to
renegotiate or non-renegotiable even when liquidation is ineﬃcient.
7There is also an ever-growing literature discussing the lender’s monitoring incen-
tives. So far the literature treated a lender’s monitoring eﬀort as exogenous. In his
model, Diamond (1989) explains how the delegation of monitoring to a ﬁnancial in-
termediary prevents both duplication of monitoring as well as free-riding. Carletti
(2004) develops a theoretical model of how a ﬁrm’s monitoring incentives are aﬀected
by the number of bank relationships and how loan rates are aﬀected by the bank’s
monitoring. She concludes that multiple banking does not necessarily increase loan
rates. In Carletti, Cerasi and Daltung (2007) multiple lending is a means of risk
mitigation through diversiﬁcation. Its beneﬁts have to be balanced against the cost
of free-riding and excessive monitoring, caused by duplication.
2.2 Empirical evidence
Empirical evidence on the determinants of loan spreads goes back to the early nine-
teen nineties. We start this survey of the relevant literature with a study by Petersen
and Rajan (1994) of the U.S. National Survey of Small Business Finance which was in-
ﬂuential for many subsequent studies. The authors compare the reputation argument
brought forward by Diamond (1989) and the hold-up theme as identiﬁed by Sharpe
(1990) and Rajan (1992). Their results are in favor of reputation, i.e. borrowing
from multiple banks implies higher interest. However, the relationship length has a
positive impact on availability of credit, but little impact on its interest rate. Berger
8and Udell (1995) restrict their data to short-term lines of credit (L/C) ﬁnancing small
businesses and do not ﬁnd evidence of hold-up neither. They show that small ﬁrms
with mature relationships pay lower interest rates and provide less collateral when
measuring relationship intensity by its duration. When diﬀerentiating between con-
centrated and competitive markets within the same data set, Petersen and Rajan
(1995) ﬁnd interest rate smoothing over the life cycle of the ﬁrm in concentrated
markets, where young entrepreneurs are charged lower interest and surviving older
ones are charged higher interest in order to recoup initial losses. With competition,
creditors cannot expect to participate in entrepreneur’s future surplus and will there-
fore charge the higher competitive interest rate initially and the lower competitive
interest rate later on. Analyzing loan data from 126 U.S. banks between 1977-1989,
Berlin and Mester (1998) do not ﬁnd evidence of loan rate smoothing in response to
credit risk shocks. However, there is evidence for smoothing with respect to interest
rate risk, especially for larger banks, independent of the character of the relationship.
This result corresponds with Berger and Udell (1992) who ﬁnd loan rates to be sticky
as compared to open-market rates over the same period.
In a study of German SME data, Harhoﬀ and Körting (1998) ﬁnd the short-term
interest rate charged on lines of credit (L/C) to be dependent on ﬁrm size and ﬁrm
age, ﬁnancial distress, the number of bank relationships, and the ﬁrm’s location.
Small ﬁrms, young ﬁrms, ﬁrms with more bank relationships, ﬁrms in cities, and
9ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress pay higher interest, whereas the relationship duration does
not aﬀect pricing. A survey of housebanks in German SME lending by Elsas and
Krahnen (1998) does not give evidence of compensatory pricing for housebanks, i.e.
credit spreads are unaﬀected by the relationship status. Analyzing the same data
set, Machauer and Weber (1998) prove housebanks to demand a higher amount of
collateral rather than higher interest compared to non-housebanks. Furthermore,
they ﬁnd a positive relationship between loan rates and borrower risk as measured
by the bank’s internal risk classiﬁcation.
For Italy, Foglia, Laviola and Marullo-Reedtz (1998) analyze the impact of mul-
tiple lending on the riskiness of corporates which they ﬁnd is positive due to reduced
monitoring eﬀorts. They conclude that one main bank relationship helps restoring
borrower discipline. In another study of Italy’s bank lending business to large and
medium-sized ﬁrms, D’Auria, Foglia, and Reedtz (1999) ascertain that the closeness
of the relationship as measured by the bank’s share in her client’s total debt is the
main component of the credit spread where a higher share results in a lower spread.
Hold-up occurs only for almost exclusive relationships. The authors reason that con-
centrating loans with one main bank while establishing other bank relationships too
i st h eb e s ts t r a t e g yt ob e n e ﬁt from the main bank’s informational advantage while
preventing hold-up.
In an empirical paper, Brunner and Krahnen (2008) study the aspect of renego-
10tiation of distressed debt in a sample of German SMEs. They ﬁnd an institution
called ’bank pool’ which acts as a coordination device and enhances multiple lenders’
ability to renegotiate, even increasing the probability of successful turnaround of a
distressed borrower when the number of banks involved is small. However, they did
not look at the pricing of loans when this coordination device is in place and whether
it renders hold-up possible in a multiple banking environment.
In this paper, we will analyze the determinants of the short-term loan spread of
German SMEs with special emphasis on the bank pool. We will show whether the
incidence of a bank pool has a signiﬁcant impact on the spread.
3H y p o t h e s e s
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed, we will summarize the
main hypotheses to be tested in this study. First of all, without taking into account
any sort of agency conﬂicts, the loan spread should reﬂect the probability distribution
of repayments from the loan granted to a ﬁrm. The higher the default probability
of a ﬁrm, the higher is the spread charged to compensate for losses in the event of
default.
H1: The loan spread increases in borrower risk. Borrowers with higher default
probabilities are charged higher prices for loans. (RISK)
The rating of a borrowing ﬁrm has been designed to measure default risk. How-
11ever, most of the parameters entering the calculation of a rating do themselves provide
a restricted measure of risk, e.g. the industry a ﬁrm is operating in or her age. Since
public rating agencies generally do only provide ratings for larger ﬁrms raising public
debt, most SMEs do not obtain such a public rating. However, banks have established
similar internal rating systems by which they can systematically judge the creditwor-
thiness of their clients or potential clients, although these rating are not displayed to
the public. Estimation in this study will rely on these internal ratings.
The spread is measured as the diﬀerence between the loan’s contracted interest
rate and the bank’s reference interest rate. Fried an Howitt (1980) provide a theoret-
ical model for interest rate smoothing within optimal contracting for risk-averse ﬁrms
fearing interest rate shocks. The spread thus varies inversely with the level of the
risk-free rate. An additional reason for the smoothing of the loan rate, relative to the
market rate, draws on the relationship lending literature (Boot 2000 for a survey).
The duration of the relationship has been shown to proxy well for relationship inten-
sity. This would suggest that with longer duration the liquidity insurance implied
by the smoothing of the contractual rate will increase, as the risk of opportunistic
behavior by the ﬁrm is decreasing. This argument is consistent with Ongena and
Smith (2001) who show that a relationship is not a one-way street, and ﬁrms do not
necessarily get locked up in these relationships.
H2: Observed short-term loan spreads vary inversely with the corresponding
12risk-free market rate. (INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING)
Once the bank entered a relationship with the borrowing ﬁrm, it learns over
time about ﬁrm’s quality, i.e. her ability to service loans. Monitoring incentives are
restored with a main or relationship bank and discipline the borrowing ﬁrm. Non-
defaulting ﬁrms acquire reputation over time and will face a lower spread according
to Diamond’s (1989) reputation building argument. .
H3: The spread decreases with the length of the relationship. (REPUTATION)
When monitoring the client ﬁrm a bank should be able to realize economies of
scope if the borrower is large in terms of its turnover. Alternatively, if size is measured
by assets, the variable may indicate bargaining power, too. In both cases we expect:
H4: The spread is negatively related to the size of the borrowing ﬁrm. (SIZE)
The reputation argument is often extended to other measures of uncertainty as
for instance the age of a ﬁrm (see Petersen and Rajan (1995)).
A ﬁrm who has established a relationship with a single bank may however not be
able to credibly convey her reputation to outsiders. The incumbent bank is able to
extract a rent from the client in this so-called hold-up situation. Outside banks are
not willing to undercut the incumbent as they fear a winner’s curse problem. The
winner’s curse argument becomes even more severe if the single bank holds part or
all of the collateral of the borrower.
13H5: The spread is non-decreasing or even increasing over the course of a single
or main relationship, particularly if the relationship is collateralized. (HOLD-UP)
Competition in lending markets, via multiple lending, will contribute to a decrease
in observed loan spreads, and it will prevent hold-up situations in repeated lending
relationships. Therefore, by itself competition from transactional relationships may
strengthen the outside funding options of the ﬁrm, reducing the scope for hold-up
situations. On the other hand, competition among multiple lenders may be eliminated
in times of borrower distress, as has been shown by Brunner and Krahnen (2008).
They demonstrate that in German SME lending, banks tend to collude by forming
pools at the start of a distress episode. The pool has been shown to facilitate borrower
workout, ahead of any bankruptcy-related court intervention. While pool formation
impedes a creditor run on borrower assets, it has not yet been tested whether the
pool is also used to enforce excess compensation, e.g. in the form of increased loan
rates. We hypothesize that, as a result of pool formation, competition is eliminated
and the observed spread will rise above the market level. Furthermore, the excess
spread during pool episodes will be larger if the level of competition (i.e. the number
of bank relationships) prior to pool formation was relatively high. Finally, as an
additional sign of hold-up, the competitive nature of the banking market may only
gradually reappear after termination of the distress episode, i.e. after re-emergence
of a borrower from distress. We therefore expect the pool-enforced excess spread to
14persist for some time after termination of the distress episode. This leads to
H6: Collusion of banks during borrower distress generates an excess spread
in short-term lending rates. The excess spread is increasing in the number of bank
relationships involved, and it persists even after termination of the distress period.
(COLLUSION)
4 Sampling, descriptive statistics and institutional design
4.1 The data set
The study relies on the CFS Loan Data Set, collected under the Center for Financial
Studies’ ﬁeld research project on Credit Management (see Elsas et al. (1998) for
further details). The data underlying our analysis include corporate debtors of ﬁve
major German banks; three of them are private listed ﬁrms, one is a public sector
institution, and one is a cooperative bank. The unit of observation is a particular
borrowing ﬁrm or, more speciﬁcally, a particular bank-borrower relationship, using
all the information regarding the borrowing ﬁrm contained in the credit ﬁles of a
bank. The data set contains in particular
• general characteristics of the ﬁrm (e.g. legal form, industry);
• the ﬁrm’s balance sheet data;
• an assessment of borrower risk, according to the bank’s internal risk rating;
15• a complete account of the bank’s outstanding loans vis-à-vis the particular
borrower, taken from its loan book; this includes information on loan terms,
e.g. volume, maturity, collateral, spread;
• general information concerning other bank relationships of the ﬁrm, including
the existence of a bank pool;
• measures taken by the bank in order to reorganize or liquidate the ﬁrm, or its
assets.
This information was collected directly from the banks’ credit ﬁles. Observations
range from January 1992 to January 1997. The sample was drawn randomly from a
population of all those corporate customers who fulﬁlled the following set of conditions
a tl e a s to n c ed u r i n gt h i st i m es p a n .
• First, ﬁrms had to be medium-sized, i.e. with an annual turnover between
25 − 250m EUR. Owing to the absence of surveillance by rating agencies and
the lack of rigorous disclosure requirements, we expected this ﬁrm size segment
to be subject to a signiﬁcant degree of asymmetric information between lenders
and borrowers, thus constituting a prime population for the analysis of issues
related to relationship lending, loan contract design, and renegotiation.
• Second, to ensure a minimum level of information with regard to the client’s
total bank debt and the number of bank relationships, a minimum total loan
16size of about 1.5mE U R( 3m DM) was imposed. All loans surpassing this level
a r es u b j e c tt ot h er e g u l a t o r yn o t i ﬁcation requirement of Article 14 of the KWG
(German Banking Act), and have to be communicated to the federal banking
supervisory agency BAFin (formerly BAKred).
• Third, ﬁr m sw i t hr e g i s t e r e do ﬃces in the former GDR (East Germany) were
excluded.
All ﬁrms fulﬁlling these three conditions established population ’A’. The pop-
ulation of ﬁrms fulﬁlling also the subsequent fourth condition is called population
’P’.
• Fourth, ﬁrms had recorded a poor internal rating at least once within the 1992-
1997 period. A poor rating is deﬁned as a rating of 5 or 6 on a standardized
rating scale applied to all banks in the sample ranging from 1 (highest grade)
to 6 (lowest grade).
After identiﬁcation of the relevant populations ’A’ and ’P’ respectively, two sam-
ples of 25 clients from ’A’ and 15 clients from ’P’ were drawn from each bank respec-
tively. This yields a sample ’A’ consisting of 125 clients and a sample ’P’ of 75 clients.
For each of these ﬁr m sas e to fs o m e2 0 0v a r i a b l e sw e r eo b s e r v e do nay e a r l yb a s i s .
Due to missing observations for some of the relevant variables during the core time
period from 1993-1996 studied in this paper, we reduced the samples to 103 ﬁrms
17in sample ’A’ and 58 ﬁrms in sample ’P’ with a total of 644 observations per year
between 1993 and 1996.2 T a b l e1s h o w st h ec o m p o s i t i o no ft h et w os a m p l e sw i t h
respect to the banks providing the data.
{insert Table 1 here}
Variables include ﬁrm-level characteristics such as legal form, industry classiﬁca-
tion, and balance sheet information. Furthermore, we collected relationship charac-
teristics as for instance duration, loan volume, loan type, pricing, collateralization,
and rating. Besides quantitative information on the ﬁrm level and with respect to
the banking relationship we also gathered information on how banks behave once the
client enters distress including the formation of bank pools.
4.2 Bank pools
The institution of a ’bank pool’ as observed in the data studied here is a formal
contractual arrangement in which lenders pool their individual claims vis-à-vis a
particular borrower in distress in order to coordinate their decision-making. Typically,
when a ﬁrm with multiple bank relationships becomes distressed, its banks summon
a so-called ’bank meeting’. This meeting serves the purpose of discussing how to deal
with the ﬁrm currently in distress, and deciding in particular whether or not a formal
2When there was more than one observation per year we only considered the last observation.
However, when there were distress measures undertaken by the bank during a year, we cumulated
this information over all observations of the respective year.
18pool among the banks should be set up. In case this latter decision is aﬃrmative, the
contract is concluded without delay. The pool contract is signed by all active bank
lenders and co-signed by the client borrower. It includes a sharing rule regarding
revenues and costs from reorganization as well as an information sharing requirement
which obliges all bank members to inform each other of circumstances that endanger
loan repayment. If a pool bank breaches the contract, e.g. by unilaterally reducing her
credit line, it becomes liable vis-à-vis the remaining pool banks to restore the agreed
pool quotas. Both together is apparently suﬃcient to prevent preemptive action by
contracting parties. For an extensive description of the bank pool see Brunner and
Krahnen (2008).
Third parties are not necessarily informed about the establishment of a pool, if
the ﬁrm’s distress hasn’t been disclosed yet. The liquidity situation of a troubled ﬁrm
would be adversely aﬀected by that signal.
The duration of the pool arrangement is unlimited, a priori. Once established, it
will last until the reorganization is completed, i.e. until the ﬁrm is able to attract
new lenders, or else until it is liquidated. In either case, the pool contract is phased
out rather than formally dissolved. Empirically, the pool is not always resolved
immediately after successful reorganization, i.e. we observe numerous cases where
the pool is sustained for some time after rating has already been upgraded.
On the face of it, the pool contract seems to establish an oligopoly of banks
19coordinating their actions and therefore a reasonable case for any anti-trust law. So
why could it be adopted for such a long time without intervention. Of course, German
anti-trust law has reviewed the bank pool. It ruled that the installation of the bank
pool aims at the reorganization of the client borrower rather than collusion of banks
to the disadvantage of the borrower. Therefore it received temporary permission for
the duration of reorganization. However, there has not been any empirical veriﬁcation
of this position which we will try to deliver in this paper.
In the following we will describe the data set with respect to borrower character-
istics, the borrower’s bank relationship observed in this sample, and, in more detail,
the risk evaluation and loan pricing decision conducted by the bank.
4.3 Borrower characteristics
Looking at the industry aﬃliation of the ﬁrms sampled in A and P, about one third
of all 161 ﬁrms belong to the manufacturing industry and further 24 per cent are
active in machinery industry as shown in Table 2. Ostentatiously, the proportion of
machinery ﬁrms in sample P is much larger than in sample A presumably related to
the strong downturn of the machinery business in Germany in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e
1990s.
{insert Table 2 here}
20Also presented in Table 2, the predominant legal form is the limited liability ﬁrm
with some 90% of the ﬁrms sampled in A, even increasing over the sampling period
by changes of the legal form. However, in sample P the percentage of unlimited
liability ﬁrms is almost twice as high in 1993 (20.7%) compared to sample A (10.7%),
but decreasing until 1996 by one third.
While sampling conditions required the ﬁrms to be medium-sized with an annual
turnover between 25 - 250m EUR, the average annual turnover ranges from 86.39m
EUR in 1993 to 98.55m EUR in 1996 in sample A (see Table 3). Average annual
turnover in sample P is somewhat smaller ranging from 78.65m EUR in 1993 to
87.85m EUR in 1996. Measuring ﬁrm size in terms of total assets, sample A shows
average total assets between 51.04 and 59.59m EUR whereas sample P’s total assets
range from 56.71 to 65.01m EUR, both increasing over the observation window. The
opposing signs of the diﬀerences between sample A and sample P, i.e. P shows lower
turnover combined with higher asset value than A, raises a ﬁrst conjecture that sample
P ﬁr m sa r ei nw o r s ee c o n o m i cs h a p e .T h i so b s e r v a t i o nc a nb ec o n ﬁrmed by looking
at performance data. Where sample A ﬁrms show on average a rather continuous
positive average annual return before taxes (ROI approximately 11-12%), sample P’s
yearly average ROI ﬂuctuates around zero between 1993 and 1996.
{insert Table 3 here}
21A look at debt numbers presented in Table 3 shows that the average debt ratio of
sample A ﬁrms is less than 60% whereas sample P’s average debt ratio reaches more
than 70%. Seen in the context of total debt ﬁnancing, banks ﬁnance around 70% of
total debt in the representative sample A and some three quarters of debt in sample
P. In line with this observation, ﬁr m si ns a m p l ePp a yo na v e r a g es o m e5 0 %m o r ei n
annual interest than sample A ﬁrms. The percentage of bank loans among total debt
is about 6 percentage points higher for sample P compared to A.
Firms sampled in A or P have on average 6 bank relationships, although at the
median ﬁrms in sample P have 1-2 more bank relationships than those sampled in A.
4.4 Relationship characteristics
Looking at the particular ﬁve banks providing the data for this study, average total
exposure of these bank relationships amounts to 8 to 8.5m EUR in sample A (8.8 to
9.1m EUR in sample P; for all relationship descriptives see Table 4).
{insert Table 4 here}
The average bank relationship has lasted for 20.2 years by 1993 for sample A
compared to 17.2 years for sample P. The banks from which the data were collected
describe themselves to be a housebank in about 43% of relationships in sample A
whereas only 31% of the collecting banks of sample P did so. Bank pools are involved
with the borrowers in 11.6-14.6% of sample A relationships, but 27.6% up to 56.9%
22of sample P relationships by 1996.
From general relationship characteristics we turn to the loan facility level now.
The fraction of short term credit lines (L/C) is 40-44% in sample A and slightly
smaller in sample P.
T h el o a ns p r e a dm e a s u r e da st h ed i ﬀerence between the nominal loan interest
rate and the 3-months FIBOR (Frankfurt Interbank Oﬀered Rate) increases between
1993 and 1996 and is systematically higher for sample P ﬁrms presumably related to
higher default risk.
Higher default risk of sample P ﬁrms may also be the reason for higher collat-
eralization. Information regarding the collateralization of exposure is displayed in
Table 5. Collateralization of sample A relationships is on average about 29-33% of
the exposure whereas it amounts to 41-46% for sample P. Restricting our view to
only those relationships with a strictly positive collateral valuation, collateralization
ranges from 42-46% in sample A to 49-51% in sample P. The most important type
of collateral is mortgage. More than 80% of collateral value for those sample A ﬁrms
with strictly positive collateral valuation stem from mortgages compared to about
72-79% for sample P.
{insert Table 5 here}
234.5 Internal ratings
The default risk of ﬁrms sampled in A or P is reﬂected in the bank-individual as-
sessment of borrower’s creditworthiness. Banks translate their risk evaluation into
a risk rating ranked on a bank-individual rating scale following the assessment of a
set of risk categories speciﬁed by each bank respectively. Internal ratings provided
by bank lenders are a crucial characteristic of our data set as the above description
of the sampling procedure demonstrated. The rating reﬂects the expected default
probability of the ﬁrm, as seen by the bank, before collateralization is taken into
account. We have no evidence of external ratings for any of the ﬁrms in our sample ,
i.e. agency ratings, which is reasonable given the fact that we are dealing with SMEs.
The rating information has been collected on every borrower and for each obser-
vation recorded in the ﬁles. Each bank in the sample uses its own rating system in
order to assess the probability of default of its borrowers. Ratings are reviewed at
regular intervals.
The standard methodology of the rating process relies on a scoring system includ-
ing quantitative and qualitative information about ﬁrm performance and prospects,
and a linear weighting system with both ﬁxed and varying weighting factors depend-
ing on the bank in question (see Brunner et al. (2000) for details). We treat ratings
as unbiased and eﬃcient estimates of expected default probabilities, as judged by the
individual bank. As long as internal ratings remain the private information of the
24bank, i.e. as long as rating information is not communicated to either the manage-
ment of the rated ﬁrm, or to some supervisory body, there is no inherent incentive for
the bank to systematically misrepresent the information available. Internal ratings
a r et h u se x p e c t e dt ob ei n f o r m a t i o n a l l ye ﬃcient (see Krahnen and Weber (2001)).
In order to compare ratings from distinct banks one needed a superior rating
scheme standardizing bank-individual ones. The standardization process is based on
the verbal descriptions of bank-individual rating categories taken from the banks’
rating manuals that instruct credit oﬃcers about how to assign a ﬁrm to a certain
rating category. Using these descriptions, each category of a bank-individual rating
system is assigned to one of the six new categories of the standardized system from 1
(lowest risk) to 6 (highest risk, default or imminent default) documented in Table 6.
Table 6 also relates the bank-individual rating categories and the standardized scale
to the rating scales of Moody’s and S&P adapted from bank-internal translation rules.
{insert Table 6 here}
Based on this standardized rating scheme, Table 7 exhibits the rating distribution
for samples A and P. It shows that sample A does not contain a single rating 6 over
the period from 1993 to 1996. Unsurprisingly, ratings of sample P are inferior to
sample A ratings by more than one category. This observation is unsurprisingly since
a rating of 5 or 6 on this transformed rating scale, at least once between 1992 and
1996, is a prerequisite for being drawn to sample P. More interesting in this regard
25are yearly rating migrations exempliﬁed in Table 7 through migrations from 1993 to
1994. It illustrates that the probability of rating migrations, up or down, is higher
for sample P ﬁrms. Ratings of around 70% of sample A ﬁrms remain constant from
one year to the subsequent year whereas only around 60% of the ratings of sample P
do not change. Additionally, there is a tendency to migrate downwards rather than
upwards in sample P not observed in sample A.
{insert Table 7 here}
4.6 Estimation methodology and results
Estimation in this study addresses the question what determines the bank’s loan
pricing, i.e. the spread above FIBOR (Frankfurt Interbank Oﬀered Rate) charged on
short-term lines of credit (L/C). Due to the lack of a high volume of cross-sectional
data, we intend to use both the cross-sectional as well as the time series dimension
of the available data set using a panel data model. The equation to be estimated is
the following
yit = α + X0
itβ + uit i =1 ,...,N; t =1 ,...,T
with i denoting the ﬁrm and t denoting the year of observation with N =1 6 1and
T =4 . The error term is composed as follows
uit = µi + υit
26where µi denotes the individual eﬀect of a ﬁrm which is unobservable and time-
invariant, and υit is the remaining error varying with time and from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. Since
ﬁrms observed in our data set are randomly drawn from the population of all ﬁrms
borrowing from one of the ﬁve banks in this study and fulﬁlling certain requirements
described in the previous chapter we can assume µi to be random and independent
of υit.We will therefore estimate a one-way error random eﬀects model with yit being
the dependent variable namely the spread on short-term lines of credit. Compared to
the ﬁxed eﬀects model this technique avoids the loss of numerous degrees of freedom.
Furthermore we pool the representative sample A and the problem sample P in
order to cover the full range of rating categories. Our presumption is that the bank-
internal risk evaluation as the bank’s measure of the ﬁrm’s probability of default is
most important in explaining the bank’s pricing decision. Due to the limited size
of the representative sample A with 103 ﬁrms observed over 4 years, we do almost
exclusively observe rating categories 1 through 4 rather than 5 or 6 which gives us
only an incomplete picture of the relationship between rating and loan pricing. We
avoid this problem by pooling the representative sample A with sample P which
covers a considerably higher percentage of lower rating categories. It is understood
that the pooling is controlled for in the regression. A caption of variables used in the
regressions is given in Table 8. As mentioned above the dependent variable of the
one-way error random eﬀects panel regression is the spread above FIBOR charged on
27lines of credit by the respective bank.
{insert Table 8 here}
Before turning to the estimation results we brieﬂy summarize the hypotheses to
be tested. We hypothesized that the spread is positively related to the borrower risk
as measured by the bank-internal rating {H1: (+)}. Since the spread itself is the
diﬀerence between the loan’s nominal interest and the bank’s reference rate, changes
in the reference rate may not be immediately translated into changes of the loan
rate, leading to interest rate smoothing, i.e. an inverse relationship between the
loan rate and the reference rate, FIBOR in this case {H2: (-)}. The spread should
however decrease over the duration of the relationship according to Diamond’s (1989)
reputation building argument {H3: (-)}. Economies of scope associated with large
size borrowers and their resulting bargaining power should coerce the bank to oﬀer
lower rates to larger clients {H4: (-)}. As a trade-oﬀ against the economies of scope
eﬀect attributed to single-sourcing, an exclusive bank relationship carries the risk of
hold-up, caused by the lack of informed competition {H5: (+)}. In general, if there
are multiple lenders extending credit to a common borrower, collusion among the
banks during borrower distress will support an increase of the spread. The observed
excess spread under lender collusion will increase in the number of relationships, and
it may last even after termination of the distress period. {H6: (+)}.
28The results reported in Table 9 show a strong eﬀect of borrower risk on loan
pricing. Firms with the lowest bank-internal risk assessment (rating categories 1 or
2) are used as a reference group. As Table 9 demonstrates, riskier borrowers (rating
categories 3 to 6) face a signiﬁcantly higher loan spread and the coeﬃcients of rating
dummies are increasing in risk, where higher rating notches correspond to higher
default risk. The coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations of the model.
This is consistent with hypothesis H1.
{insert Table 9 here}
Addressing the loan spread as the diﬀerence between the contracted nominal in-
terest rate on short-term lines of credit and the prevailing inter-bank market interest
rate, the FIBOR, only the nominal rate is set by the bank. The regression coeﬃ-
cient of the market rate reveals whether loan rates are pro- or countercyclical. In the
latter case loan rates are smoothing market movements. As can be seen from Table
9, the coeﬃcient of the FIBOR3M is signiﬁcantly negative, supporting hypothesis
H2. Thus, there is evidence of interest rate smoothing in our data as banks at least
partially insure their borrowers against short-run volatility of market interest rates.
Relationship duration has no signiﬁcant impact on the spread, implying that either
the length of a relationship is not a good proxy for borrower reputation, or there is
no unidirectional learning eﬀect in borrower-lender relationships. Hypothesis H3 is
rejected.
29Hypothesis H4 addresses possible economies of scope and cross selling eﬀects, as
well as the eﬀect of borrowers’ bargaining power on the loan rate. The coeﬃcient of
the logarithm of borrower’s annual turnover is negative and signiﬁcant. Thus, the
loan spread decreases in the size of the borrowing ﬁrm, supporting hypothesis H4.
We employ a second size variable in all speciﬁcations, proxying for borrower assets.
We ﬁnd both coeﬃcients to be signiﬁcant at or above the 5% level where asset size,
which may be interpreted as a proxy for bargaining power is more relevant in loan
rate formation than cross selling arguments which may be related to business ﬂow,
or turnover. Testing for economies of scale on the bank’s side we also introduced
the bank’s total exposure vis-à-vis the borrower measuring borrower size in terms of
loans; the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant here.
We next turn to the impact of hold-up on the loan spread when there is a strong
bank lender with an informational advantage, either a sole bank lender or a main
lender (i.e. the housebank), as hypothesized in H5. The relevant variable for a
sole bank lender, SINGLEBANK, is signiﬁcant at 5% and 10% level for diﬀerent
speciﬁcations while the housebank variable is not. Note that the interaction term of
t h es i n g l eb a n ka n dt h eu n c o l l a t e r a l i z e dp o r t i o no fe x p o s u r ei ss i g n i ﬁcantly negative.
It signiﬁes an increase in bargaining power, when the single bank also holds collateral
rights. A possible explanation rests on the limited outside options of a borrower
with a single bank and fewer assets left for pledging to outside lenders. Higher
30collateralization by itself is signiﬁcantly related to higher spreads. This observation is
consistent with descriptive statistics demonstrating higher collateralization for sample
P compared to sample A. Concluding from both observations, banks demand more
collateral from riskier borrowers while charging them higher spreads, too.
Hypotheses H6 is the main hypothesis in this paper, referring to the elimination
of lender competition, and its impact on the loan spread.
The key variable, POOL, captures the structured cooperation among creditors
thereby eliminating the competition that may have existed before pool formation.
Such pools are tolerated by German courts to the extent that they are set up to
organize a borrower workout or resolution. In Table 9, the coeﬃcient of the POOL
variable is positive and highly signiﬁcant, supporting hypothesis H6. The presence of
lender coordination signiﬁcantly raises the spread, after controlling for other sources
of spread heterogeneity like default risk, ﬁrm size, bank identity and so forth. This
result is found to be robust in a number of alternative speciﬁcations.
In regression (vi) of Table 9, we distinguish between small and large pools. Deﬁn-
ing a SMALL POOL-dummy comprising the lower tertile of the number of banks (up
to 4 bank relationships), and a dummy for LARGE POOL with ﬁve or more banks.
R e s u l t ss h o wt h a tt h ep o o le ﬀect clearly depends on the number of banks involved.
For small pools the coeﬃcient is small, in absolute terms, and only weakly signiﬁcant
at the 10% level. Large pools capture the main eﬀect on the spread. Its coeﬃcient is
31larger, in absolute terms, and it is highly signiﬁcant. Thus, the change in competition
intensity, which is higher with more lenders, generates a higher excess spread.
In model (vii) the eﬀect of the pool on spreads is analyzed separately for two
distinct episodes in the life of the borrowing ﬁrm, namely distress and non-distress
periods. The internal rating serves to distinguish between these periods. Interestingly,
and consistent with the idea that collusion leads to a ’hang-over’ in that the excess
spread continues to exist even when the reason for the collusion, the borrower distress
has been resolved. We ﬁnd the pool to be highly signiﬁcant even after an upgrade
of the internal rating. This clearly shows that the pool is also an anti-competitive
instrument which, once in place, has a life of its own. However, pools do not exist
forever, so we ﬁnd the post-distress excess spread to be lower relative to in-distress
periods, suggesting a slow decay of lender collusion.
Finally, the bank identity also plays a role as emanated from signiﬁcant bank
eﬀects in our regression.
The pooling of samples A and P is indirectly controlled for by the inclusion of the
rating dummy for rating classes 5-6 as sample P requires such a rating to be observed
at least once during the observation window. To test robustness we also replicated
regression (v) of Table 9 as the base case including a sampling dummy equal to 1 if
the observation is from sample P and zero if it is from sample A. Results are shown in
speciﬁcation (v.P) with no substantial diﬀerences to the previous regression results.
32The key variable in our estimations is the POOL variable. We cannot exclude
the possibility that there is endogeneity in our setup. The economic argument for
endogeneity is that pools may be formed precisely because the relevant determinants
for a potential hold-up situation are anticipated by the lenders, and they therefore
are able to agree on a pool contract more easily. In this case, the same variables
that determine an excess spread will also determine whether or not a pool is formed.
To control the implied bias in the estimation, we run a two stage estimation. The
estimated values from a ﬁrst stage pool formation regression are used to replace the
pool dummy in the second stage regression. Table 10 reports the results. We ﬁnd all
results discussed already conﬁrmed.
{insert Table 10 here}
5C o n c l u s i o n
Multiple lending in bank-borrower relationships plays an important role in the theory
of banking and corporate ﬁnance. In this paper we add new insights to the role of
multiple banking, only partly supporting the claims made in the theoretical literature.
Relying on a panel data set of 161 bank-ﬁrm relationships taken from the ﬁles of 5
German banks traced over a 4-years period (1993-1996), we identify determinants in
loan rate setting for short-term SME loans.
We ﬁnd the credit spread to be sensitive with respect to the bank’s risk assess-
33ment of the borrower’s default risk with positive sign and high signiﬁcance. We also
ﬁnd loan rate smoothing with respect to interest rate shocks. A signiﬁcant hold-up
premium has been identiﬁed for exclusive bank relationships, but not for relationship
lenders with superior information such as housebanks. When assessing the banking
relationship by its duration, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact on the spread .
The major result of our analysis relates to the role of multiple banking in loan rate
setting. The majority of ﬁrms in the sample have more than one bank relationship,
averaging 6 over the entire sample, with a maximum value of 19. We ﬁnd strong
evidence for lender coordination by means of a bank pool in situations of borrower
distress, leading to a signiﬁcantly higher loan spread. The increase is also high in
economic terms, averaging about 35 basis points. A priori it is unclear whether
t h i sl a r g ei n c r e a s ei nl o a ns p r e a dr e ﬂects an increased eﬀort extended by the pool
banks in order to work out the distressed borrower, or a hold-up premium charged by
coordinated banks, or a combination of both. Our results strengthen the presumption
that the potential hold-up through multiple coordinated banks is eﬀectively exercised.
However, the hold-up premium carries over to post-distress periods, where we observe
a decay of the premium as new competition from outside banks presumably kicks in
again.
Our results show that, in contrast to some predictions in the literature, the fact
that lenders are numerous does not necessarily imply they are unable or unwilling to
34coordinate their interest. Once coordination of multiple lenders becomes a realistic
scenario, hold-up is no longer limited to single lenders.
References
BALTAGI, B. H. (2008), Econometric Analysis of Panel Data (Chichester: John
Wiley & Sons Ltd).
BERGER, A. N. and UDELL, G. F. (1995), "Relationship Lending and Lines
of Credit in Small Firm Finance", Journal of Business, 68, 351-381.
BERGLOF, E., ROLAND, G. and VON THADDEN, E.-L. (2000), ”An Incom-
plete Contracts Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy” (mimeo).
BERLIN, M. and L. J. MESTER (1998), "On the Proﬁtability and Cost of
Relationship Lending", Journal of Banking & Finance, 22,8 7 3 - 8 9 7 .
BESTER, H. (1985), "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect
Information", The American Economic Review, 75,8 5 0 - 8 5 5 .
B O L T O N ,P .a n dS C H A R F S T E I N ,D .S .( 1 9 9 6 ) ,” O p t i m a lD e b tS t r u c t u r ea n d
the Number of Creditors”, The Journal of Political Economy, 104,1 - 2 5 .
BOOT, A. W. A. (2000), "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?", The
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9, 7—25.
35B O O T ,A .W .A .a n dT H A K O R ,A .V .( 2 0 0 0 ) ," C a nR e l a t i o n s h i pB a n k i n g
Survive Competition?", The Journal of Finance, 55,6 7 9 - 7 1 3 .
BRIS, A. and WELCH, I. (2005), ”The Optimal Concentration of Creditors”,
The Journal of Finance, 60, 2193-2212.
BRUNNER, A. and KRAHNEN, J. P. (2008), "Multiple Lenders and Corporate
Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring", T h eR e v i e wo fE c o n o m i cS t u d i e s ,
75, 415-442.
BRUNNER, A., KRAHNEN, J. P. and WEBER, M. (2000), ”Information Pro-
duction in Credit Relationships: On the Role of Internal Ratings in Commercial
Banking” (Center for Financial Studies Working Paper No. 2000/10).
CARLETTI, E. (2004), "The Structure of Relationship Lending, Endogenous
Monitoring and Loan Rates”, The Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13,
58-86.
CARLETTI, E., CERASI, V. and DALTUNG, S. (2007), "Multiple-bank Lend-
ing: Diversiﬁcation and Free-riding in Monitoring”, The Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 16,4 2 5 - 4 5 1 .
D’AURIA, C., FOGLIA, A. and MARULLO REEDTZ, P. (1999), "Bank In-
36terest Rates and Credit Relationships in Italy", Journal of Banking & Finance,
23, 1067-1093.
D E T R A G I A C H E ,E . ,G A R E L L A ,P .a n dG U I S O ,L .( 2 0 0 0 ) ,” M u l t i p l ev e r s u s
Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence”, The Journal of Finance,
55, 1133-1161.
DIAMOND, D. W. (1984), "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitor-
ing", The Review of Economic Studies, 51,3 9 3 - 4 1 4 .
DIAMOND, D. W. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets", The
Journal of Political Economy, 97,8 2 8 - 8 6 2 .
E L S A S ,R . ,H E N K E ,S . ,M A C H A U E R ,A . ,R O T T ,R .a n dS C H E N K ,G .( 1 9 9 8 ) ,
”Empirical Analysis of Credit Relationships in Small Firm Financing: Sampling
Design and Descriptive Statistics” (Center for Financial Studies Working Paper
No. 1998/14).
ELSAS, R. and KRAHNEN, J. P. (1998), ”Is Relationship Lending Special?
Evidence from Credit-File Data in Germany”, Journal of Banking and Finance,
22, 1283-1316.
ELSAS, R. and KRAHNEN, J. P. (1999), ”Collateral, Default Risk, and Rela-
37tionship Lending: An Empirical Study on Financial Contracting” (Center for
Financial Studies Working Paper No. 1999/13).
F O G L I A ,A .L A V I O L A ,S .a n dP .M A R U L L OR E E D T Z( 1 9 9 8 ) ," M u l t i p l e
Banking Relationships and the Fragility of Corporate Borrowers", Journal of
Banking & Finance, 22, 1441-1456.
FREIXAS, X. (2005), "Deconstructing Relationship Banking", Investigaciones
Económicas, 29,3 - 3 1 .
FRIED, J. and HOWITT, P. (1980), "Credit Rationing and Implicit Contract
Theory", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 12,4 7 1 - 4 8 7 .
GORTON, G. and KAHN, J. (2000), "The Design of Bank Loan Contracts",
The Review of Financial Studies, 13, 331-364.
GREENBAUM, S. I., KANATAS, G. and VENEZIA, I. (1989), "Equilibrium
Loan Pricing Under the Bank-Client Relationship", Journal of Banking & Fi-
nance, 13,2 2 1 - 2 3 5 .
HARHOFF, D. and KÖRTING, T. (1998), "Lending Relationships in Germany
- Empirical Evidence from Survey Data", Journal of Banking & Finance, 22,
1317-1353.
38KRAHNEN, J. P. and WEBER, M. (2001), ”Generally Accepted Rating Prin-
ciples: A Primer”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 25,2 - 2 4 .
MACHAUER, A. and WEBER, M. (1998), "Bank Behavior Based on Internal
Credit Ratings of Borrowers", Journal of Banking & Finance, 22, 1355-1383.
ONGENA, S. and SMITH, D. C. (2000), ”What Determines the Number of
Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence”, The Journal of Financial In-
termediation, 9,2 6 - 5 6 .
ONGENA, S. and SMITH, D. C. (2001), ”The duration of bank relationships”,
Journal of Financial Economics, 61,4 4 9 - 4 7 5 .
PETERSEN, M. A. and RAJAN, R. G. (1994), "The Beneﬁts of Lending Re-
lationships: Evidence from Small Business Data", The Journal of Finance, 49,
3-37.
PETERSEN, M. A. and RAJAN, R. G. (1995), "The Eﬀect of Credit Market
Competition on Lending Relationships", The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
110,4 0 7 - 4 4 3 .
PURI, M., ROCHOLL, J. and STEFFEN, S. (2009), "The Impact of the U.S.
Financial Crisis on Global Retail Lending" (mimeo).
39RAJAN, R. (1992), ”Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and
Arm’s-Length Debt”, The Journal of Finance, 47, 1367-1400.
RAJAN, R. and WINTON, A. (1995), ”Covenants and Collateral as Incentives
to Monitor”, The Journal of Finance, 50, 1113-1146.
SHARPE, S. A. (1990), "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit
Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships", The Journal of Fi-
nance, 45, 1069-1987.
STIGLITZ, J. E. and A. WEISS (1981), "Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information", The American Economic Review, 71,3 9 3 - 4 1 0 .
Appendix
40Table 1
Sampling
Bank source sample A sample P
Bank 1 20 12
Bank 2 24 9
Bank 3 21 13
Bank 4 23 14
Bank 5 15 10
Total 103 58
Table 2
Borrower - Frequency statistics
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996
Industry
Mining 0 0
Manufacturing 40 12
Machinery 18 21
Electricity 4 4
Automobile 3 constant over time 6 constant over time
Energy 2 2
Construction 10 2
Trade 19 5
Services 3 1
Transportation 2 2
Real estate 2 2
Total 103 58
Legal form and liability
Corporation (limited) 92 92 92 93 46 48 49 50
Partnership (unlimited) 5 5 5 4 7 6 5 4
Sole Proprietorship (unlimited) 6 6 6 6 5 4 4 4
Total 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
sample A sample  P
* There were 9 changes in legal form during the observation window 1993-1996 of which 5 
changes were accompanied by a limitation of liability. Table 3
Borrower - Descriptive statistics
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total assets [m EUR]
N Valid 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 51.04 53.67 58.60 59.59 56.71 57.64 59.73 65.01
Median 34.14 35.92 34.17 33.33 36.32 36.11 38.97 42.47
Percentiles .25 15.86 17.75 19.52 19.52 21.02 19.18 22.76 23.36
.75 64.66 60.43 71.60 72.13 70.35 65.12 73.24 71.18
Std. Deviation 60.05 61.51 67.41 72.07 63.31 67.98 65.93 78.14
Annual turnover [m EUR]
N Valid 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 86.39 92.10 96.12 98.55 78.65 74.31 76.04 87.85
Median 56.83 59.52 61.31 63.72 57.50 54.13 55.02 55.35
Percentiles .25 31.43 33.64 37.35 34.95 30.03 24.72 29.33 32.12
.75 103.04 106.78 115.93 120.17 104.00 90.85 109.14 104.22
Std. Deviation 115.07 111.19 113.71 118.75 74.95 71.64 68.34 100.70
Return on investment [%]
N Valid 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 11% 12% 13% 11% 1% -2% 0% -1%
Median 5% 5% 6% 4% 1% -1% 1% 1%
Percentiles .25 2% 2% 1% 1% -2% -6% -3% -2%
.75 13% 16% 14% 13% 3% 2% 3% 3%
Std. Deviation 19% 20% 31% 31% 5% 11% 8% 11%
* annual profit before taxes / total assets
Indebtedness [%]
N Valid 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 59% 58% 58% 59% 71% 73% 72% 73%
Median 57% 56% 58% 59% 71% 74% 77% 77%
Percentiles .25 45% 45% 42% 41% 60% 61% 60% 62%
.75 72% 72% 74% 74% 83% 86% 87% 88%
Std. Deviation 19% 19% 20% 20% 18% 19% 20% 19%
* total debt / total assets
Bank debt share [%]
N Valid 101 101 101 101 55 55 55 55
Missing 2222 3333
Mean 70% 69% 69% 73% 77% 76% 78% 76%
Median 72% 72% 74% 83% 82% 79% 85% 83%
Percentiles .25 51% 52% 48% 49% 65% 60% 61% 66%
.75 100% 99% 100% 100% 93% 97% 100% 98%
Std. Deviation 27% 27% 28% 29% 21% 22% 23% 24%
* total bank debt / total debt
No. of bank relationships
N Valid 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 5.85 5.85 5.85 5.92 6.52 6.05 6.07 5.93
Median 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
Percentiles .25 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
.75 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.25 7.00 7.00
Std. Deviation 4.89 4.82 4.89 4.89 3.71 3.12 3.07 3.00
sample A sample PTable 4
Relationship - Descriptive statistics
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996
Relationship duration [years]
N Valid 103 58
Missing 0 0
Mean 20.21 17.24
Median 18.00 15.00
Percentiles .25 6.00 increases accordingly 6.75 increases accordingly
.75 24.00 23.00
Std. Deviation 18.681 13.920
Housebank (dummy variable)
yes 43 45 44 44 18 17 18 19
no 60 58 59 59 40 41 40 39
Total 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Bank Pool (dummy variable)
yes 12 12 14 15 16 23 28 33
no 91 91 89 88 42 35 30 25
Total 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Total exposure [Million EUR]
N Valid 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 8.04 8.32 8.06 8.47 9.10 8.90 9.12 8.81
Median 5.07 5.11 4.60 5.30 6.84 5.62 5.57 5.28
Percentiles .25 2.77 2.84 2.65 2.81 3.58 3.55 3.39 2.99
.75 9.96 11.62 11.76 11.56 11.14 12.55 11.84 11.37
Std. Deviation 8.31 8.49 8.57 8.73 8.20 8.18 8.96 8.66
Short-term exposure [%]
N Valid 100 100 99 96 53 52 51 50
Missing 3347 5678
Mean 44% 43% 44% 40% 39% 40% 43% 40%
Median 39% 35% 38% 34% 33% 35% 31% 36%
Percentiles .25 20% 20% 19% 18% 19% 20% 19% 19%
.75 59% 66% 66% 56% 56% 55% 58% 57%
Std. Deviation 28% 29% 30% 29% 26% 25% 45% 29%
* short-term lines of credit (LC) / total exposure
Short-term (LC) spread [%]
N Valid 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 3.15 3.54 3.64 3.80 3.53 4.01 4.31 4.70
Median 3.10 3.55 3.55 3.67 3.56 4.14 4.25 4.76
Percentiles .25 2.64 2.88 2.96 3.11 3.04 3.18 3.39 3.86
.75 3.69 4.01 4.15 4.41 4.28 4.81 4.99 5.38
Std. Deviation 0.815 0.778 0.858 0.925 1.245 1.316 1.350 1.506
* nominal LC interest rate ./. FIBOR
sample A sample PTable 5
Collateralization - Descriptive statistics
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996
Collateral (dummy variable)
N Valid 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Missing 0000 0000
yes 71 71 74 71 49 48 53 53
no 32 32 29 32 9 10 5 5
* equals 1 if collateral valuation is strictly positive
Collateralization [%]
N Valid 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 30% 29% 33% 32% 41% 43% 46% 44%
Median 24% 27% 27% 27% 39% 37% 41% 40%
Percentiles .25 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 15% 19% 20%
.75 52% 47% 53% 49% 65% 73% 74% 65%
Std. Deviation 31% 29% 31% 32% 32% 34% 33% 32%
* Collateral value / total exposure
Collateralization given collateral [%]
N Valid 71 71 74 71 49 48 53 53
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 43% 42% 45% 46% 49% 51% 50% 49%
Median 36% 35% 41% 43% 46% 48% 42% 45%
Percentiles .25 21% 25% 23% 25% 29% 23% 24% 25%
.75 62% 59% 60% 59% 69% 78% 78% 69%
Std. Deviation 28% 26% 28% 29% 28% 31% 32% 30%
* Collateral value / total exposure | collateral value > 0
Mortgage collateral [%]
N Valid 71 71 74 71 49 48 53 53
Missing 0000 0000
Mean 82% 82% 83% 85% 72% 74% 79% 76%
Median 100% 100% 100% 100% 77% 89% 95% 89%
Percentiles .25 73% 73% 76% 90% 50% 53% 60% 56%
.75 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Std. Deviation 34% 33% 31% 30% 31% 32% 30% 31%
* Mortgage value / collateral value | collateral value > 0
sample A sample PTable 6
Rating standardization
Standardization
Standardized bank 
rating
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 S&P Moody
1
outstanding quality
1
very good risk
1
outstanding quality
1.0 - 1.2 
outstanding 
quality, low risk
1
outstanding 
performance, 
lowest risk
1.00 - 1.49
outstanding quality
AAA
AA+ 
AA
AA-
Aaa
Aa1 
Aa2 
Aa3
Highest to High 
Investment 
Grade
2
good quality, 
above average
2
good risk
2
good quality
1.3 - 2.7 
good quality, 
above average
2
high quality, 
above average
1.50 - 2.49
good quality
A1
A2 
A3 
Baa1 
Baa2
A+
A
A- 
BBB+
BBB
Upper Medium 
to Medium 
Investment 
Grade
3
average quality, 
increased risk
3 - 3/4
satisfactory/ 
adequate  risk
3
satisfactory quality 
with weaknesses
2.8 - 3.7
average 
quality/risk
3
average 
performance
2.50 - 2.99
satisfactory quality
Ba1
Ba2
Ba3
BB+
BB
BB-
Speculative 
Grade
4
speculative grade, 
below average 
quality
4
sufficient risk
4
sufficient quality, 
intensive care
3.8 - 4.2
speculative grade, 
intensive care
4 - 5
sufficient quality, 
increased risk
3.00 - 3.49
sufficient quality
B1
B2
B3
B+
B
B-
5
problematic, 
intensive care, 
reorg.
4/5 - 5
just sufficient / 
insufficient risk
5
deficient quality, 
substantial 
problems
4.3 - 5.7
default imminent, 
intensive 
care/reorg.
6 - 7
intensive care, 
weak/neg. 
prospects
3.50 - 4.49
low quality
Caa1
Caa2
Caa3
Ca
C
CCC+
CCC
CCC-
CC
C
Highly 
Speculative 
Grade
6
default, 
reorg./
liquidation
6
extremely bad risk
6 - 7
inadequate quality, 
default
5.8 - 6.5
default, reorg./
liquidation
8
default, operating 
loss, neg. 
prospects
4.50 - 5.00
default or 
imminent default
D D Default
Agencies' Rating Categories Bank-Internal Rating CategoriesTable 7
Internal ratings - Frequency statistics
Rating distribution
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996
Borrower rating (%)
1 1 1 1 176 3311
11% 11% 7% 6% 5% 5% 2% 2%
2 1 9 2 5 2 7 2 3 2211
18% 24% 26% 22% 3% 3% 2% 2%
3 4 03 13 73 9 1 0 7 7 3
39% 30% 36% 38% 17% 12% 12% 5%
4 3 03 32 83 1 1 71 41 61 5
29% 32% 27% 30% 29% 24% 28% 26%
5 3344 2 0 2 3 2 3 2 6
3% 3% 4% 4% 34% 40% 40% 45%
6 0000 69 1 0 1 2
0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 16% 17% 21%
Total 103 103 103 103 58 58 58 58
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Rating migration
TO (1994)
Sample A 1 23456 Total up const. down
1 731 . . . 1 1 . 74
64% 27% 9% . . . 100% . 64% 36%
2 4 1 311 . . 1 94 1 32
21% 68% 5% 5% . . 100% 21% 68% 11%
3 . 8 25 7 . . 40 8 25 7
. 20% 63% 18% . 100% 20% 63% 18%
4 . . 4 2 42 . 3 04 2 42
. . 13% 80% 7% . 100% 13% 80% 7%
5 .1 .1 1 .3 2 1 .
. 33% . 33% 33% . 100% 67% 33% .
6 ...... 0 ...
...... 0 ...
Total 11 25 31 33 3 0 103 18 70 15
11% 24% 30% 32% 3% 0% 100% 17% 68% 15%
TO (1994)
Sample P 1 23456 Total up const. down
1 3 ..... 3 . 3 .
100% ..... 100% . 100% .
2 . 2 .... 2 . 2 .
. 100% .... 100% . 100% .
3 . . 442 . 1 0 . 46
. . 40% 40% 0.2 . 100% . 40% 60%
4 . . 2861 1 7287
. . 12% 47% 35% 6% 100% 12% 47% 41%
5 . . 1 2 13 4 20 3 13 4
. . 0.05 10% 65% 0.2 100% 15% 65% .
6 .... 24624 .
.... 3 3 % 6 7 % 1 . 6 7 % .
Total 3 2 7 14 23 9 58 7 34 17
3% 2% 7% 14% 22% 9% 56% 12% 59% 29%
F
R
O
M
 
(
1
9
9
3
)
F
R
O
M
 
(
1
9
9
3
)
sample A (N=103) sample P (N=58)Table 8
Main Variable Definition
Variable Name Type Definition
SPREAD numerical short-term nominal interest rate ./. FIBOR3M
RATING1-2 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if internal rating category is 1 or 2, zero otherwise
RATING3 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if internal rating category is 3, zero otherwise
RATING4 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if internal rating category is 4, zero otherwise
RATING5-6 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if internal rating category is 5 or 6, zero otherwise
FIBOR3M numerical 3-month Frankfurt Interbank Offered Rate 
POOL Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if there is a bank pool, zero otherwise
SMALLPOOL Interaction dummy (0,1) equals 1 if no. of bank relationships is at most 4 and a bank pool exists
LARGEPOOL Interaction dummy (0,1) equals 1 if no. of bank relationships is 5 or higher and a bank pool exists
POOL WITHOUT DISTRESS Interaction dummy (0,1) equals 1 if rating class is 4 or lower (better) and bank pool exists
POOL IN DISTRESS Interaction dummy (0,1) equals 1 if rating class is 5 or 6 (distress) and bank pool exists
NUMBEROFBANKS numerical number of firm's established bank relationships
HOUSEBANK Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if observed bank is housebank, zero otherwise
SINGLEBANK Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if observed bank is sole bank lender, zero otherwise
UNCOLLATERALIZED numerical 1 - (collateral value / bank's total exposure)
HOUSEBANK x UNCOLL. numerical equals uncollateralized portion of housebank's exposure, zero for others
SINGLEBANK x UNCOLL. numerical equals uncollateralized portion of single bank's exposure, zero for others
LOG(DURATION) in years natural log of length of the bank relationship in years
LIABILITY Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if firm's legal form implies unlimited liability, zero otherwise
LOG(SIZE) numerical natural log of firm's annual turnover from latest balance sheet
LOG(SIZEA) numerical natural log of firm's total assets from latest balance sheet
EXPOSURE numerical bank's total exposure
BANKDEBT numerical total bank debt
RETURNONIVESTMENT numerical earnings before taxes / total assets
BANK2 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if firm is observed at bank 2, zero otherwise
BANK3 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if firm is observed at bank 3, zero otherwise
BANK4 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if firm is observed at bank 4, zero otherwise
BANK5 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if firm is observed at bank 5, zero otherwise
SAMPLE P Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if observation is originated in sample P
IFO numerical IFO business climate index
YEAR1994 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if firm is observed in year 1994, zero otherwise
YEAR1995 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if firm is observed in year 1995, zero otherwise
YEAR1996 Dummy (0,1) equals 1 if firm is observed in year 1996, zero otherwiseTable 9
Regression results I
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (v.P)
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
RATING3 0.2394 0.1049 ** 0.2458 0.1050 ** 0.2490 0.1087 ** 0.2225 0.1073 ** 0.2446 0.1056 ** 0.2495 0.1061 ** 0.2474 0.1052 ** 0.2158 0.1049 **
RATING4 0.3599 0.1126 *** 0.3763 0.1127 *** 0.3288 0.1174 *** 0.3447 0.1170 *** 0.3792 0.1131 *** 0.3881 0.1135 *** 0.3881 0.1133 *** 0.3173 0.1136 ***
RATING5-6 0.3904 0.1232 *** 0.4036 0.1225 *** 0.3768 0.1277 *** 0.3645 0.1295 *** 0.4100 0.1230 *** 0.4160 0.1233 *** 0.3499 0.1334 *** 0.2746 0.1287 **
FIBOR3M -0.2068 0.0171 *** -0.2067 0.0173 *** -0.2050 0.0171 *** -0.2113 0.0165 *** -0.2105 0.0165 *** -0.2094 0.0167 *** -0.2092 0.0165 *** -0.2150 0.0164 ***
POOL 0.3943 0.1100 *** 0.4020 0.1098 *** 0.4272 0.1150 *** 0.3968 0.1102 *** 0.4012 0.1103 *** , , , , 0.3437 0.1105 ***
SMALLPOOL , , , , , , , , , , 0.3170 0.1732 * , , , ,
LARGEPOOL , , , , , , , , , , 0.4331 0.1201 *** , , , ,
POOL WITHOUT DISTRESS , , , , , , , , , , , , 0.3326 0.1269 *** , ,
POOL IN DISTRESS , , , , , , , , , , , , 0.5120 0.1517 *** , ,
NUMBEROFBANKS 0.0159 0.0138 0.0178 0.0137 0.0068 0.0144 0.0171 0.0137 0.0175 0.0137 0.0156 0.0139 0.0179 0.0137 0.0175 0.0136
HOUSEBANK 0.1030 0.1927 , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
HOUSEBANK x UNCOLLATERALIZED -0.1922 0.2600 , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
SINGLEBANK , , 0.5982 0.3039 ** 0.6196 0.3093 ** 0.5788 0.3032 * 0.5745 0.3035 * 0.5739 0.3042 * 0.5638 0.3026 * 0.6335 0.3008 **
SINGLEBANK x UNCOLLATERALIZED , , -1.6412 0.6698 ** -1.5524 0.6897 ** -1.6409 0.6735 ** -1.6382 0.6749 ** -1.6446 0.6781 ** -1.6185 0.6715 ** -1.7414 0.6688 ***
UNCOLLATERALIZED -0.2535 0.1616 -0.2557 0.1380 * -0.3003 0.1422 ** -0.2401 0.1372 * -0.2480 0.1372 * -0.2459 0.1375 * -0.2625 0.1373 * -0.2115 0.1362
LOG(DURATION) 0.0402 0.0732 0.0406 0.0727 , , , , , , , , , , , ,
LIABILITY -0.0978 0.1649 -0.1096 0.1648 , , , , , , , , , , , ,
LOG(SIZE) -0.0991 0.0495 ** -0.0927 0.0498 * , , -0.0834 0.0505 * -0.0920 0.0499 * -0.0932 0.0501 * -0.0893 0.0497 * -0.0760 0.0496
LOG(SIZEA) -0.1771 0.0748 ** -0.1885 0.0741 ** , , -0.1975 0.0754 *** -0.1788 0.0735 ** -0.1791 0.0734 ** -0.1795 0.0734 ** -0.1891 0.0727 ***
EXPOSURE , , , , -0.0085 0.0073 , , , , , , , , , ,
BANKDEBT , , , , 0.0007 0.0021 , , , , , , , , , ,
ROI , , , , , , -0.2284 0.2150 , , , , , , , ,
BANK2 0.7194 0.2070 *** 0.7086 0.2030 *** 0.7856 0.2069 *** 0.6924 0.1999 *** 0.6980 0.1994 *** 0.7004 0.1978 *** 0.7065 0.2001 *** 0.7302 0.1971 ***
BANK3 -0.3802 0.2216 * -0.3942 0.2188 * -0.5317 0.2099 ** -0.4499 0.2019 ** -0.4532 0.2016 ** -0.4501 0.2003 ** -0.4405 0.2023 ** -0.4226 0.1992 **
BANK4 -0.0198 0.2013 -0.0070 0.1978 0.0277 0.2011 -0.0241 0.1947 -0.0275 0.1943 -0.0256 0.1929 -0.0249 0.1948 0.0035 0.1921
BANK5 0.0432 0.2223 0.0427 0.2196 -0.0272 0.2160 0.0174 0.2104 0.0158 0.2099 0.0138 0.2082 0.0250 0.2107 0.0220 0.2073
SAMPLE P , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0.459404 0.140322 ***
ONE 5.3880 0.4212 *** 5.3710 0.4006 *** 4.5700 0.2277 *** 5.5432 0.3193 *** 5.4664 0.3114 *** 5.4718 0.3111 *** 5.4604 0.3113 *** 5.3192 0.3109 ***
N 644.00 644.00 624.00 644.00 644.00 644.00 644.00 644.00
R-squared 0.3489 0.3574 0.3346 0.3569 0.3568 0.3629 0.3576 0.3730
LM-Test 308.69 *** 303.52 *** 292.12 *** 303.94 *** 304.86 *** 295.57 *** 305.07 *** 302.03 ***
The table reports regression results on the bank's pricing decision on short-term credit lines (LC). We test a one-way error component random effects model. The dependent variable is the spread measured as the difference between the bank's nominal interest rate charged on
short-term credit lines and the 3-months Frankfurt Interbank Offered Rate (FIBOR). All explanatory variables are defined in Table 8. We control for the pooling of samples A and P in specification (v.P) by including the 'sample P' dummy equal to 1 for sample P
observations and zero otherwise. The levels of significance are indicated as follows: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). N gives the number of observations. The LM-Test statistic refers to the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test testing for random effects. If the null hypothesis of
zero group variance cannot be rejected the pooled OLS regression is appropriate. If the LM-Test statistics is sufficiently large, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the random effects model.Table 10
Regression results II - 2SLS
(i) (v.2) (vi.2) (vii.2) (v.2.P)
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
BANK1 -3.4021 1.8818 * RATING3 0.2860 0.1089 *** 0.2892 0.1087 *** 0.2858 0.1086 *** 0.2607 0.1077 **
BANK2 -2.7860 1.8332 RATING4 0.3610 0.1163 *** 0.3614 0.1160 *** 0.3683 0.1172 *** 0.2954 0.1162 **
BANK3 -1.9968 1.8700 RATING5-6 0.3370 0.1309 ** 0.3360 0.1306 ** 0.3075 0.1368 ** 0.1795 0.1361
BANK4 -3.0683 1.8527 * FIBOR3M -0.2167 0.0170 *** -0.2164 0.0169 *** -0.2160 0.0169 *** -0.2199 0.0168 ***
BANK5 -2.9814 1.8611 POOL IV 0.3921 0.1284 *** , , , , 0.3862 0.1267 ***
IFO 0.0152 0.0208 SMALLPOOL IV , , 0.1789 0.1893 , , , ,
RATING3 0.1691 0.2254 LARGEPOOL IV , , 0.5026 0.1471 *** , , , ,
RATING4 0.6711 0.2222 *** POOL WITHOUT DISTRESS IV , , , , 0.3098 0.1827 * , ,
RATING5-6 1.3347 0.2297 *** POOL IN DISTRESS IV , , , , 0.4474 0.1549 *** , ,
NUMBEROFBANKS 0.0170 0.0157 NUMBEROFBANKS 0.0234 0.0145 0.0214 0.0145 0.0235 0.0145 0.0224 0.0143
HOUSEBANK 0.2370 0.1432 * SINGLEBANK 0.5429 0.3091 * 0.5496 0.3082 * 0.5373 0.3084 * 0.6234 0.3053 **
UNCOLLATERALIZED -0.6369 0.2182 *** SINGLEBANK x UNCOLLATERALIZED -1.6088 0.6858 ** -1.6227 0.6842 ** -1.6001 0.6832 ** -1.7458 0.6780 **
LIABILITY -0.2900 0.1979 UNCOLLATERALIZED -0.2776 0.1412 ** -0.2555 0.1415 * -0.2820 0.1409 ** -0.2196 0.1400
LOG(DURATION) -0.1296 0.0838 LOG(SIZE) -0.0919 0.0510 * -0.0932 0.0508 -0.0893 0.0509 * -0.0750 0.0505
LOG(SIZE) 0.3572 0.1318 *** LOG(SIZEA) -0.1599 0.0767 ** -0.1686 0.0766 ** -0.1587 0.0767 ** -0.1764 0.0755 **
LOG(SIZEA) -0.3220 0.1428 ** BANK2 0.6634 0.2106 *** 0.6563 0.2099 *** 0.6595 0.2112 *** 0.7247 0.2070 ***
BANKDEBT 0.0084 0.0028 *** BANK3 -0.4973 0.2158 ** -0.5055 0.2151 ** -0.4915 0.2164 ** -0.4691 0.2118 **
YEAR1994 -0.0101 0.3318 BANK4 -0.0119 0.2020 -0.0142 0.2013 -0.0140 0.2026 0.0249 0.1982
YEAR1995 0.2046 0.2619 BANK5 -0.0059 0.2183 -0.0139 0.2176 -0.0099 0.2190 0.0044 0.2140
YEAR1996 0.3421 0.2242 SAMPLE P , , , , , , 0.5419 0.1442 ***
ONE 5.4807 0.3268 *** 5.5146 0.3265 *** 5.4699 0.3275 *** 5.2966 0.3248 ***
N 624.00 624.00 624.00 624.00
N 624.00 R-squared 0.3283 0.3338 0.3286 0.3528
Chi-squared 158.39 *** LM-Test 308.04 *** 304.12 *** 307.01 *** 303.45 ***
The table reports regression results on the bank's pool
formation. We estimate a standard probit model with
dummy variables for each observation year controlling for
the panel structure of the data. The dependent variable is
the pool dummy equal to one when a pool is observed. All
explanatory variables are defined in Table 8. The levels of
significance are indicated as follows: 1% (***), 5% (**),
10% (*). N gives the number of observations.
The table reports regression results of a two-stage estimation on the bank's pricing decision on short-term credit lines (LC). We test a one-way error component
random effects model using the estimated pool variable form a probit regression in the 1st stage as instrumental variable. The instrument is also employed within the
pool interaction terms. The dependent variable is the spread measured as the difference between the bank's nominal interest rate charged on short-term credit lines
and the 3-months Frankfurt Interbank Offered Rate (FIBOR). All explanatory variables are defined in Table 8. The levels of significance are indicated as follows: 1%
(***), 5% (**), 10% (*). N gives the number of observations. The LM-Test statistic refers to the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test testing for random effects. If
the null hypothesis of zero group variance cannot be rejected the pooled OLS regression is appropriate. If the LM-Test statistics is sufficiently large, the null
hypothesis is rejected in favor of the random effects model.
1st stage 2nd stageCFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2010/06  Roman Kräussl 
André Lucas 
David R. Rijsbergen, 
Pieter Jelle van der Sluis 
Evert B. Vrugt 
Washington Meets Wall Street: A Closer 
Examination of the Presidential Cycle Puzzle 
2010/05  Sander J.J. Konijn 
Roman Kräussl 
Andre Lucas 
Blockholder Dispersion and Firm Value 
2010/04  Narasimhan Jegadeesh 
Roman Kräussl 
Joshua Pollet 
Risk and Expected Returns of Private Equity 
Investments: Evidence Based on Market 
Prices 
2010/03  Roman Kraeussl 
Christian Wiehenkamp 
A Call on Art Investments 
2010/02  Roman Kraeussl  
Stefan Krause 
Are particular industries more likely to 
succeed? A comparative analysis of VC 
investment in the U.S. and Europe 
2010/01  Nikolaus Hautsch 
Dieter Hess 
David Veredas 
The Impact of Macroeconomic News on Quote
Adjustments, Noise, and Informational 
Volatility 
2009/32  Guenter W. Beck 
Kirstin Hubrich 
Massimiliano Marcellino 
On the importance of sectoral shocks for 
price-setting 
2009/31  Axel Groß-Klußmann 
Nikolaus Hautsch 
Quantifying High-Frequency Market Reactions 
to Real-Time News Sentiment 
Announcements 
2009/30  Volker Wieland  Quantitative Easing:  
A Rationale and Some Evidence from Japan  
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  